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ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS AND BEYOND:
THREE MODEST PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
E. DONALD ELLIOTT*
I. BEYOND THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR IDEAL INSTITUTIONS
Legend has it that the great architect Frank Lloyd Wright was once
asked what he would do if he was appointed city planner for New York
City. "Blow it up, move fifty miles up the Hudson, and start again," he
supposedly harrumphed.
The line is usually good for a chuckle, precisely because we all
understand that life really doesn't work that way. Most of the time, we
have to work with the raw materials that previous generations have
bequeathed us, and we are only able to make modest changes that build on
what has gone before. Only in fantasy do we get the chance to blow it all
up, move fifty miles up the Hudson, and start all over again.
In that spirit, I offer three modest proposals for what we might do to
improve environmental law in the United States in the next generation. 1
They are: (1) increased use of environmental markets ("cap and trade" or
bubble programs) and other incentive-based regulatory instruments; (2)
retroactive application of the Chevron2 decision, which would help to clear
out some of the policy underbrush left by overly aggressive past court
decisions; and (3) increased use of information production and
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I After this article was largely written, I discovered that I was in good company in
making these suggestions. Two out of my three suggestions-increased reliance on
incentive-based regulation and on information disclosure---are also on future agenda of
leading environmental economist and Resources for the Future President Paul Portney.
Paul R. Portney, Environmental Problems and Policy: 2000-2050, RESOuRcEs 6, 6-7 (No.
138, Winter 2000). 1 agree with most of Portney's other predictions, including that: "The
principal environmental challenge for the developed world today is helping the developing
countries to increase their standards of living in ways that help them skirt, to as great an
extent as possible, the pollution-intensive period the developed countries underwent. " Id.
at9.
2 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (giving
administrative agencies greater discretion to construe statutes).
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dissemination as a strategy to stimulate so-called "voluntary ' 3 actions to
protect the environment.
While I am a strong supporter of expanding the use of environmental
markets, trading and other incentive-based systems, and also of
information creation and disclosure programs, I recognize that even these
are not the Holy Grail of environmental institutions. There are no perfect
institutions. For every strategy, there are limitations, and these limitations
can become the basis for exploitative counterstrategies. 4 For. this reason,
legal techniques tend to wear out over time as participants figure out
strategic behaviors to "game the system."
The debate that still rages in some quarters about whether
environmental markets are better than command-and-control regulation
strikes me as about as nonsensical as a debate about whether airplanes or
trucks are a better method of transportation. Obviously, each has its
inherent strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, each has its role, or
"ecological niche," and a composite system comprised of both is likely to
be more adaptable than a "pure" system composed of either one alone. For
the same essential reasons, I have long been an advocate of "hybrid
systems" of environmental regulation in which market-based and
"voluntary" approaches supplement but do not supplant traditional
command-and-control standard-setting. 5 A healthy legal system is like a
healthy ecosystem,6 and nature abhors uniformity and thrives on diversity.
Dangers are created when any species becomes too dominant and crowds
out its competitors. Information, "voluntary" actions, environmental
3 I dislike the term "voluntary," which I believe obscures the true nature of actions
taken in response to incentives other than legal compulsion. E. Donald Elliott,
Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Control Program that Works!, 92 MIcH. L.
REv. 1840, 1849-52 (1994) (review of QuALrTY ENVTL. MGMT. SUBCOMMrrrEE,
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ENvTL. QUALITY, TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT: A FRAMEwoRK
FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION (1993)).
4 This essential point can be shown formally as a matter of game theory in terms of
whether a particular game has a "dominant" strategy. Intuitively, it was captured in the
(in)famous series Spy vs. Spy in MAD MAGAZINE. For every creative scheme devised by the
Black Spy, the White Spy invented an effective counter-strategy and vice versa.
5 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Foreword: A New Style of Ecological Thinking in
Environmental Law, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Elliott, New Style]; E.
Donald Elliott, Environmental Law at a Crossroad, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 1 (1992) (Siebenthal
lecture); Elliott, supra note 3; E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecological Law and Policy, in
THINKNG ECoLoGIcALLY 170 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); E. Donald
Elliott & Gail Charnley, Toward Bigger Bubbles: Why Interpollutant and lnterrisk Trading
Are Good Ideas and How We Get There From Here, 13 F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PuB. POL'Y
48, 48-54 (Winter 1998) [hereinafter Elliott & Charnley].
6 Elliott, New Style, supra note 5, at 7.
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markets and command-and-control standard setting all have important
roles to play in an overall portfolio of environmental institutions.
The proper question for aspiring environmental policymakers is not
whether environmental markets or information disclosure work "better"
than command-and-control standard setting. The answer to that question is
as obvious as it is trivial: sometimes they do and sometimes they don't.
Rather, the important question is how to define the proper domain of each
of these techniques based upon its characteristic strengths and weaknesses.
This is the inverse of then-professor Stephen Breyer's famous theory of
"regulatory mismatch," the idea that some regulatory problems occur
because we use techniques' that are ill-adapted to the structure of a
particular problem.
7
In the second section, I will elaborate on several features of
environmental markets that make them attractive in certain circumstances.
Many of these advantages are familiar, such as the potential for markets to
reduce costs as compared to uniform standards set by government. Other
advantages of market-based approaches are less familiar but equally
important, such as the potential for market-based approaches to economize
on the resources required to regulate in some circumstances. 8 One statistic
illustrates how important and pronounced this advantage can be: there are
about 15,000 government employees working on air pollution control in
the United States, of whom only about fifty (0.3% of the total) work in the
acid rain program at EPA, yet this single market-based program has
produced a substantial portion of the reductions in air pollution over the
last decade.9 Elsewhere I have called this the "leverage" factor: the ratio
between direct government expenditures and the resources that they are
able to leverage in the private sector. Implementing legal controls to
manage the environment is a task of stunning complexity that continually
challenges and expands the limits of legal techniques. One of the reasons
that EPA has had qualified success in achieving some environmental
progress 10 is that EPA typically uses high leverage techniques, such as
informal rulemaking, rather than case-by-case adjudication. Incentive-
based systems are a new state-of-the-art in high leverage techniques, by
which government can manage complex systems at far less direct
expenditure of its own resources.
7 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULAnTON AND UTs RrORM 191 (1982).
8 Elliott & Charnley, supra note 5.
9 See U.S. EPA, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE EPA ACID RAIN PROGRAM, EPA 430-R-
99-011, 6 (1999).
10 Steven A. Cohen, EPA: A Qualified Success, in CONTROVERSIES IN
ENvIRoNmE~NAL POLICY 174-91 (Sheldon Kamieniecki et al. eds., 1986).
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A good example is EPA's recent twenty-three state nitrogen oxide
(NO.) state implementation plant (SIP) call.II EPA found it much easier
to set up a model rule for a tradeable market -in NO, allowances with a far
lower expenditure of the government's resources than what would have
been required to amend each states' SIP for each individual source on a
case-by-case basis. Of course, this NO, market built upon techniques and
technologies developed previously for other programs, but the example
illustrates the point that in some circumstances, markets can be far more
efficient for government regulators than old-fashioned case-by-case
command-and-control regulation.
Enhanced efficiency for government is an important but under-
appreciated advantage of market-based systems. In my view, the
chemical-by-chemical, source-by-source system of environmental
protection through legalistic regulation in the United States is "an inch
wide and a mile deep:" historically, we regulate too few problems but we
regulate the few that we do deal with more stringently that we probably
should. This misallocation of resources often results because of the very
high information processing costs that are a precondition for government
standard-setting using traditional command-and-control techniques under
the American system of legality and administrative law. The rising tide of
calls from Europe and environmentalists for greater use of the
"precautionary principle" should be seen as a protest against the high
transaction costs of the American system of legalistic regulation. It would
be a great boon to more effective protection of the environment in the
United States if we could achieve higher leverage ratios like those of the
acid rain trading program. The higher leverage ratios of incentive-based
systems in managing complex problems are why a serious discussion of
large-scale future programs such as global climate or maintaining
biological diversity must include the potential use of market-based tools.
Unfortunately, however, not every environmental problem is amenable
to a market-based solution, at least not in the short run. In the second
section, I also discuss some of the preconditions required for markets to
function, such as the availability of technologies to delimit and enforce
property rights.
In the third section, I suggest that the Chevron decision should be
applied retroactively, in the sense that agencies should "non-acquiesce" in
past court decisions in which courts were overly aggressive in interpreting
environmental statutes in a manner that would not pass muster if the case
11 63 Fed. Reg. 56,292 (proposed Oct. 21, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52
and 97); 64 Fed. Reg. 28,250 (final rule May 25, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52);
65 Fed. Reg. 2,674 (amended final Jan. 18, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 and
97). This regulation dealt with the affected states' implementation plans for nitrogen
oxides.
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had been decided by the Supreme Court. Many of the distortions in our
environmental laws that bedevil policy-making today, such as the inability
of EPA to consider costs and benefits in setting standards under the Clean
Air Act, do not in fact result from past decisions by Congress (although
this loose claim is often asserted imprecisely). Rather, these bad decisions
that distort policymaking often are the accumulated baggage that has built
up over time from past court decisions that purported to "interpret"
"congressional intent" based on either ambiguous statements in legislative
history or the court's view of Congress's "purpose." Such decisions would
clearly not pass muster under the current paradigm for courts to defer to
reasonable administrative constructions of statutes except when Congress
has made a conscious policy decision on the issue. 12 However, these past
decisions, even though erroneous under today's standards, rule us from the
grave. I believe that agencies should consider themselves not to be bound
by past court precedents that are clearly invalid under today's standards for
interpreting statutes. Let us call this "intertemporal non-acquiescence."
The policy considerations are similar to the more familiar problem of
geographic non-acquiescence. The government refuses to follow the
decisions of one court of appeals outside the geographic boundaries of the
circuit so that the issue may be decided by other circuits and perhaps
eventually corrected by the Supreme Court. By parity of reasoning,
agencies have a responsibility to the integrity of the legal system as a
whole to refuse to go along with past court decisions if they conclude that
those decisions are probably incorrect if evaluated by the post-Chevron
standards for the proper roles of courts and agencies.
In the fourth section, I consider how information production and
disclosure programs sometimes work to produce dramatic gains for the
environment, and explore why we have nonetheless under-invested in these
programs. I conclude that the problem is with the theories of human nature
that underlie our shared account of environmental problems. Underlying
every theory of law, implicitly or explicitly, is a theory of human nature.
In designing laws, we implicitly reflect our conception of what motivates
human beings and how a system of legal incentives can re-shape human
behavior.13 In the case of environmentalism, however, our shared theory
12 For a good summary of the Chevron decision and its implications for changing
the relationships between agencies and reviewing courts, see Kenneth W. Star, Judicial
Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986). See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 2071 (1990); Peter H. Schuck
& E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative
Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984 (1991).
13 See E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 595 (1997) [hereinafter Elliott, Law and Biology]; E. Donald Elliott, Contributions of
Ethology and Evolutionary Biology to Modifying the Model of Human Nature in US. Law,
(continued)
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of human nature has been drawn largely from the economic model of
human nature, which I shall call homo oeconomicus. This narrow view of
human nature as selfish and unenlightened is exemplified in Garrett
Hardin's famous parable, The Tragedy of the Commons.14  Hardin
imagines a world in which grazing land is held in common, and asserts that
each individual cattle herder will supposedly place additional cows onto
the commons until its carrying capacity is exceeded and they all starve. 15
This results, according to Hardin, because each individual is only
concerned about the potential for selfish gain from the additional cow and
pays no attention to the potential disaster looming for the community as a
whole. 16
Despite its great influence on modem American environmentalism, in
actuality Hardin's model is too simplistic in portraying human nature as
unalloyed in its short-sightedness and selfishness. r 7 Human beings do
indeed suffer from the failings that Hardin identified to some degree, and
environmental disaster can result. But there are also numerous success
stories in human history in which human communities anticipated the
problems of environmental degradation and took effective action to
prevent disaster. 18  Because the economic model of human action
enshrined in Tragedy of the Commons overlooks these potential positive
sides to the human spirit, we have overlooked and undervalued the extent
to which collective foresight, information production and dissemination,
education and developing cultural values are also powerful tools that can
be used along with legal orders and economic incentives for protecting the
environment.
Interdisziplinares Kolloquim zur Schwerpunkt "Recht und Verhalten" der Volkswagen-
Stiftung, Beitrage der Sozial-und Verhaltenswissenschaft zur Mechenbild des Rechts
(contribution to volume of papers presented at Volkswagen Foundation Interdisciplinary
Conference on contributions of behavioral science to the model of human nature in law)
(Forthcoming 2000) (on file with author and Capital University Law Review) [hereinafter
Elliot, Contributions].
14 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
15 Id. at 1244.
16 Id.
17 See also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bringing People Back: Toward a
Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205 (1982)
(criticizing economic model of human motivations as too narrow).
18 Conrad Totman, The Forests of Tolgawa Japan, 18 TRANS. AsIATIc Soc. JAPAN
3d I (Tokyo, 1983); Conrad Totman, THE GREEN ARCHAPELIGo: FoREsTRY IN PRE-
INDusTRIAL JAPAN 189-90 (1989). Other examples of both successes and failures are
collected in JAM) DiAmOND, THE THIRD CHIMANZEE: THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF THE
HuMANANAL 317-38 (1992).
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These "softer" programs work in practice; now the challenge is also to
make them work in theory. Experience with programs such as NEPA, 1 9
TR120 and the 33/50 program 2 1 have all demonstrated that mandatory
advantage identification and assessment of looming environmental
problems and information disclosure can be powerful tools in the
environmental area. Similar requirements for information production and
dissemination are mainstays of the legal approach to regulation in many
other areas of law, such as regulating securities markets, but at least until
recently we have tended to undervalue their effectiveness in protecting the
environment. So-called "voluntary" information disclosure programs can
make an important contribution to an overall or portfolio strategy for
environmental improvement. Again, they should not replace but
supplement command-and-control standard setting by government.
Although they are an important part of an overall approach, they have been
systematically under valued because our models of human nature and
motivations are too narrow.
II. INCREASED USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS AND INCENTIVES
There is already a substantial and growing academic literature on the
virtues of environmental markets, as well as a very successful large-scale
pilot program-the acid rain trading program under Title IV of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments.2 2 As someone who served as General
Counsel of EPA during the years that the acid rain trading program was
designed and initially implemented, I do not minimize the importance or
difficulty of expanding on that model and extending it to other situations.
In my opinion, this is probably the most important task domestically in the
years immediately ahead.
Many different reform proposals, such as the "Alternative Compliance
Systems" proposed in the Second Generation Environmental Improvement
Act2 3 are tantamount to constrained market trading systems, albeit clothed
in different rhetoric. It is not yet generally understood that alternative
compliance is also a kind of "bubble" or "cap and trade" system that
utilizes the "logic of the bubble' 24 to achieve greater efficiency. Under an
19 National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
20 Toxics Release Inventory, 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (1998).
21 Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7849 (1991).
22 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.). See also Portney, supra note I; Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins,
Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 EcoLOGY
L.Q. 1 (1991). There are also notable failures. For example, so far EPA has been unable to
adapt market-based trading systems to control non-point sources of water pollution.
23 H.R. 3448, 106th Cong. (1999).
24 Elliott & Charnley, supra note 5.
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alternative compliance system (or any "performance standard" for that
matter), the "cap" is the existing level of control set by command-and-
control regulation, and the only "trades" that are permitted are internal
ones-substituting one method of performance for another. A
"performance standard" for a single source is a very small bubble that
constrains trading in many ways, so the potential for efficiency gains are
limited. On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of the acid rain
trading program as a "bigger bubble" over the entire electric utility
industry for a single pollutant over ten years. Broadening out even more, it
is possible to imagine a still "bigger bubble" by substituting one kind of
environmental risk reduction for another (with all of the measurement
problems that doing so would entail). 2 5
All of these programs with different names build on the essential
"logic of the bubble"--the idea of trading regulatory burdens to the entity
that can bear them most efficiently. This concept was first described in
print by Ronald Coase in 1960,20 applied at EPA in the late 1970s and
upheld by the Supreme Court in the Chevron case in 1984.27 One of the
primary tasks of the next generation, in my view, is assimilating and
applying the "logic of the bubble" in its many different guises.
Some of the advantages of environmental markets are well understood
in the literature. Where there is a diversity of sources and the possibility of
over-control, environmental markets or trading systems may use what I
call the "logic of the bubble" to achieve equivalent or better protection of
the environment at a fraction of the cost of conventional command-and-
control systems. In addition, bubbles create dynamic incentives for the
development of innovation and improved technologies. These are some of
the primary features of bubbles that have received attention in the literature
to date. Several of the other advantages of environmental markets are not
as well understood in the literature, however. In proper cases, an
additional advantage of environmental trading systems is that they can
economize on the governments' own information processing costs. Thus,
market-based approaches can enable government to regulate many of the
"second generation" environmental problems. These second generation
problems consist of a diversity of small sources that are very difficult to
regulate through traditional command-and-control standard setting because
of the high information processing costs that our system of legality and
administrative law sets as a precondition for government regulation. 2 8
25 See id.
26 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1(1960).
27 467 U.S. at 866.
28 Francis S. Blake, The Economic Impacts of Environmental Regulation, 5 NAT.
RES. & ENV'T 23 (1990). See also Daniel C. Esty & Marion R. Chertow, Thinking
Ecologically: An Introduction, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 5. For a tongue-in-
(continued)
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This additional important advantage of markets is only now beginning to
be grasped in the literature. Markets economize on the government's own
costs in regulating. A lack in ability of the government to acquire and
process information is often the key factor limiting the progress of
environmental regulation. Underlying the swelling support for the
"precautionary principle" in Europe is a protest against the high
information costs imbedded in the culture of regulation by the legalistic
bureaucracy in the United States. Our system of legality and
administrative law requires building a huge "record" that will withstand
judicial review as a precondition to government regulation. These high
transaction costs for government caused by the current style of regulation
by bureaucratic standard setting in the United States result in a system of
environmental regulation that is "an inch wide and a mile deep"--a system
that regulates both too little and too much at the same time. Thus, we
should condemn the overuse of inefficient command-and-control systems
in the United States not just because they waste industry's money, but also
because their inefficiency and high demand for information processing by
government as a precondition for environmental improvements results in
under regulation by leaving large segments outside the regulatory
umbrella. The intuitive appeal of the "precautionary principle" is the
simple notion that there must be a better way; we cannot hold the populace
hostage while lawyers and bureaucrats argue about the scientific evidence.
Often, the "better way" is to establish a market in tradeable rights.
Markets do not require extensive information processing by government to
"fine tune" the right answer. Such delays are frustrating to the advocates
of the "precautionary principle," who are anxious to get on with the (to
them) obvious work of regulating what needs to be regulated. Setting up a
market in tradeable rights often requires far less expenditure of resources
by the government than regulating by bureaucratic command and control.
This is the underlying insight behind Dick Stewart's analogy between
"command-and-control" environmental regulation and "Soviet-style
central planning."2
9
Markets work. At least sometimes. They do not emerge by magic, but
presume certain underlying foundational technologies as prior
developments, such as accurate means to measure and to enforce property
rights. On the other hand, there are certain necessary preconditions for
effective environmental trading. These are well understood in the
theoretical literature that discusses property rights, but the preconditions
cheek parody of the problems that information acquisition and processing poses for
command-and-control regulation by a former EPA Adminstrator, see Douglas M. Costle,
Brave New Chemical: The Future Regulatory History of Phlogisten, 33 ADMiN. L. REv. 195
(1981).
29 Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9
HARv. ENVTn. L. REv. 1 (1985).
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are not always familiar to environmental policymakers. In the same way
that surveying and fences made possible the movement to enclose common
lands in England, the development of continuous emission monitors and a
regulatory structure to enforce tradeable rights in air made the acid rain
trading system possible. Two of the primary preconditions for an
environmental market are (1) an effective technology for measuring and
delimiting the rights to be traded, and (2) an effective legal system for
enforcing the property rights. 30 The challenge in creating an
environmental market is often to design the predecessor regulatory system
that will create proper incentives to produce the technological
developments that are preconditions for a transition to a market.
III. APPLYING CHEVRON RETROACTIVELY
The Supreme Court's decision in NRDC v. Chevron3 1 is one of the
most important administrative law decisions of this era. While
commentators still debate whether Chevron implicitly had constitutional
underpinnings or was merely a default rule for interpreting congressional
intent, there is little doubt that the decision effectively changed the balance
of power between courts and agencies. 3 2 The fundamental effect of
Chevron was to alter the prevailing understanding of what it means for a
statute to "have" a meaning and for Congress to have an "intent." Before
Chevron, the prevailing legal fiction was that statutes inherently "had" a
"meaning" for every conceivable legal issue that might arise, and that it
was the office of the courts, particularly the courts of appeal, to discern
these imminent but pre-existing "meanings" by deducing them from
ambiguous stimuli such as legislative history. Chevron did away with the
fiction that a statute "had" a single correct "meaning" on every issue. It
substituted instead the idea that unless Congress had focused on an issue
and made a conscious policy decision, there was an implied delegation to
the agency to adopt any "reasonable" interpretation of the statute. 33 In
place of the fiction of a single, ascertainable congressional "intention,"
Chevron substitutes the fiction-or default assumption--of an implied
delegation.3 4
There are strong policy reasons to favor the shift in the power of
construing ambiguous statutes from lower courts to agencies. The
involvement of courts with most statutes is episodic and their
30 See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am.
ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
31 467 U.S. 837.
32 Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (1994).
33 467 U.S. at 865-66.
34 Id.
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understanding of the policy implications of their decisions is fragmentary.
A court is likely to reach a result that is unsound from a policy perspective
because of "designer" legislative history procured by special interests,3 5 or
what the court may mistakenly view as good policy through the distorted
lens of a single case. For all their flaws, agencies, which are entrusted with
administering the statute and making it work over the long haul, generally
reach better results where statutes are ambiguous.
Therefore, I favor applying the Chevron principle of deferring to
reasonable agency construction of ambiguous statutes not only
prospectively, but also retroactively. In other words, I believe that
agencies should no longer consider themselves bound by past court
"precedents" that were decided before Chevron in which lower courts
imposed more aggressive interpretations than would be sustainable under
the modem Chevron rule.
There are numerous examples of the "dead hand" of past bad court
decisions that still rule us from the grave in the environmental area. Two
important examples under the Clean Air Act3 6 are Lead Industries Assn. v.
EPA, 37 and Alabama Power Co. v. Castle.3 8 In Lead Industries, the D.C.
Circuit relied principally on a floor statement by Senator Muskie, the
principal sponsor of the 1970 Clean Air Act, to impose the fundamental
principle of clean air law that economic costs may not be considered in
setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards.3 9 This decision was
almost certainly wrong under the modem view that floor statements by
single legislators, even sponsors, are not in and of themselves binding.4 U
Yet the "principle" that EPA may not consider costs in setting standards
still distorts and bedevils standard setting under the Clean Air Act.
4 1
This issue is now before the Supreme Court in the American Trucking
case. In Alabama Power, the D.C. Circuit overturned a variety of EPA
interpretations of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program,
permanently warping and distorting that program in many ways.
35 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WiLLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COA/DmrTY AiR
(1981).
36 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
37 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
38 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
39 647 F.2d at 1152-53.
40 Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (floor statements considered,
but not controlling).
41 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) cert.
Granted, Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S.Ct. 2003 (2000). See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REv. 303 (favoring
considering costs in setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards).
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My view is that where past court decisions clearly went beyond the
proper limits of statutory construction, as explicated by the Supreme Court
in Chevron, or gave binding weight to scraps of legislative history in ways
that are now seen as improper under subsequent Supreme Court
decisions,4 2 agencies should no longer consider themselves bound by
these past precedents. Instead, if the statute is truly ambiguous (as when
Congress has not made a conscious policy decision under Chevron 1),
agencies should consider themselves free to re-visit the policy issues under
Chevron II, despite prior court decisions. This situation is analogous to
other situations in which an intervening Supreme Court decision casts
doubt on the continued validity of prior precedent.
My former Dean at Yale, now Circuit Judge Calabresi, has written
persuasively about the problems of "statutorification," the tendency of
statutes to become encrusted and rigid as interpretations accumulate.4 3
This is particularly true where courts have imposed mandatory
interpretations on an unwilling agency responsible for administering the
statute. After all, as a matter of basic administrative law, an agency
choosing a permissive interpretation under Chevron II is free to change its
views in the light of subsequent experience. 4 4 Not so with interpretations
imposed by courts on agencies before Chevron. However, if the agency
continues to acquiesce and follow past court precedents, the issue is much
less likely to come back to the courts for more definitive re-examination.
This of course is the basic rationale justifying "non-acquiescence" by the
government in courts of appeals' decisions that it considers erroneous in
other areas.4 5
There are obviously countervailing considerations that militate in favor
of following past precedents, which are generally grouped together under
the term stare decisis. The stability and integrity of law is undermined if
agencies are too free to declare themselves freed from strictures imposed
by past court decisions. However, my current view is that we could do
more good than harm if agencies were to recognize a limited power to
provoke reconsideration of past errors made by courts through overly-
aggressive interpretations of statutes that would not be permitted today
under Chevron. I say "my current view" advisedly, because ten years ago,
42 See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S 253 (1986).
43 GuiDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATuTES (1982).
44 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). See also
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
45 For a general explanation of the policies behind the non-acquiescence doctrine,
see United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel
does not apply against the United States because it "would substantially thwart the
development of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a
particular legal issue"). Id at 160.
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when I was EPA General Counsel and might actually have been able to do
something about this, my view was otherwise. Some thoughtful members
of my senior staff approached me and proposed exactly what I am now
advocating; that we at EPA should declare ourselves no longer bound by
overly aggressive past court decisions such as Alabama Power. I had no
stomach for it. My reasoning was obvious; too many expectations had
been built up around past decisions to change them now, even if they were
erroneous under the new paradigm for defining relationships between
courts and agencies. In many cases, Congress had re-enacted the statute in
the meantime. Perhaps I also felt that we had enough to do by fighting
contemporary political battles instead of re-opening old ones.
Now, from the luxury of the sidelines, it appears to me that I was
wrong in the view that I adopted when in the arena. Congressional re-
enactment really should not count for much. As a practical matter in
Congress, there is a large difference between overturning a court decision
by majority in both houses and just not making a conscious policy decision
on the matter. One requires an aroused majority; the other mere inaction
(or negative majorities, as when no policy option could capture a majority).
The basic teaching of Chevron is that if a majority of both houses of
Congress does not care enough to mandate an outcome, we ought to let the
agency decide, provided of course that its policy decision is reasonably
consistent with the statute. Leaving aside for a moment whether the
reallocation of power from judges to the executive branch was legitimate
as a matter of constitutional law,4 6 in my view, the Chevron principle is a
sound norm that results in decisions that are better as a matter of policy.
Chevron ought to apply to past abuses by lower courts that imposed their
own will on the law in the guise of interpreting congressional intent as well
as to the abuses that occurred after the Supreme Court saw the light in
1984.
IV. How INFORMATION PROTECTS THE ENVIRONMENT,
OR WHY HARDIN WAS WRONG
My third "modest suggestion" for the future of environmental law and
policy is increased reliance on information generation and dissemination
and "voluntary" programs for pollution prevention and reduction. 4 7 Here
the issue is largely theoretical. As illustrated by the remarkable success of
the National Environmental Policy Act,4 8 the Toxic Release Inventory
4 9
46 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State,
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1983) (questioning the propriety of judicial deference to agency
interpretation of law).
47 Elliott, supra note 3.
48 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852,42 U.S.C. § 4321.
49 42 U.S.C. § 11,023.
2001] 257
HeinOnline -- 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 257 2001-2002
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW
and the EPA's 33/50 programs, 50 and the rapid expansion of International
Standards Organization (ISO) certification systems,5 1  so-called
"voluntary" systems that rely on information generation and dissemination
work well in practice. Now the challenge is to see whether they can be
made to work in theory.
This is not a trivial problem. Like all humans, we see the world
around us through the lens of our culture. Ironically, the prevailing legal
culture of environmentalism is largely drawn from economics. It teaches
us that human beings (and particularly, their institutions such as
corporations) are selfish and ignorant and therefore incapable of acting for
the common good except under the compulsion provided by law.
Emblematic of this cynical view of human nature as homo oeconimicus is
Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons,5 2 which has become the
fundamental "creation myth" for modem American environmentalism. So
strong is the hold on our minds of this cultural picture of human nature as
selfish and shortsighted that we are generally incapable of perceiving
contrary data showing that information dissemination and voluntary
systems do in fact work in some circumstances to contribute significantly
to protecting the environment.
Why do people recycle? According to the selfish theory of human
motivations assumed by Hardin, 53 they should not bother to waste their
time and effort in doing something that benefits them very little. One of
the great embarrassments to legal theory in the environmental area is that
we cannot explain why people do sometimes act to protect the environment
when it is not in their apparent self-interest to do so. The models of human
nature that underlie environmental regulation generally presume that
people are unenlightened and selfish about the choices they make that
affect the environment and therefore that "solutions" to environmental
problems must either involve threats of punishment (such as standard-
setting backed by criminal and civil penalties) or appeals to selfishness
(economic incentives such as tradeable rights or subsidies).
54
In actuality, however, a very substantial portion of what both people
and corporations do to take actions to protect the environment is not
prompted by signals emanating from government that appeal to the selfish
side of our nature. School kids recycle. Individuals donate to the Nature
50 56 Fed. Reg. 7,849.
51 ISO 14,001: Environmental Management Systems, International Standards
Organization (ISO), ISO 14,001: 1996(E) (Sept. 1, 1996). See also International
Organization for Standardization, available at http://www.iso.ch/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2000).
52 Hardin, supra note 14.
53 Id. at 1244.
54 See id. at 1246.
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Conservancy, and to environmental advocacy groups. Companies install
control systems for unregulated pollutants. "Voluntary" systems such as
EPA's 33/50 program achieve huge reductions in pollution. 55 Analysis of
proposed projects under NEPA often results in re-design to minimize
environmental effects.
56
None of these behaviors are supposed to happen under the prevailing
models of human behavior that underlie our concept of environmental
protection, and so we deny their existence. This is the way that all cultures
deal with "facts" for which they do not yet have an adequate theoretical
explanation. Even those who advocate information as a control technique
invoke a mysterious outside force-"community pressure"i-to explain
why companies reduce their emissions in response to publication of data.
For example, economist Paul Portney writes: "experience has shown that
when firms are required to make public their emissions, they eelpressure
to reduce those emissions even when they are perfectly legal. -5 7
No matter how loudly people insist that only coercive measures work
to produce real benefits for the environment, it is just not true. To be sure,
the opposite is also not the case. Human beings are neither wholly good
nor wholly evil, neither wholly selfish nor wholly altruistic, but a complex
mixture of the two. I do not contend that "voluntary" programs or
education or appeals to our "better side" are the only devices that should be
used in protecting the environment. There is a role for criminal
enforcement, and for markets and economic incentives. But there is also
an important role for softer devices, devices that appeal to a side of human
nature that has generally been overlooked in the theoretical account of the
nature of environmental problems that had been nearly universal in
America during the last few decades. Thus, we are systemically over
valuing and over relying on "hard" devices and policy instruments and
under valuing and under-using "softer" ones, because we are building on a
distorted picture of human nature. To get the mix of policies right for the
future, we have got to go back to the beginning and correct an error that
lies deep in the heart of the modem "creation myth" for the current culture
of environmentalism: Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons.
58
In 1968, at the dawning of the modem environmental movement,
Garrett Hardin published his extraordinarily influential article in Science
called The Tragedy of the Commons.59 Where property is held as a
55 See Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7849.
56 National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
57 Portney, supra note 1, at 7 (emphasis added). See also Elliott, supra note 3, at
1851 for a similar statement.
58 Hardin, supra note 14.
59 Id. The next few paragraphs describing and criticizing Hardin's argument are
drawn from Elliott, Contributions, supra note 13.
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common resource free to. be exploited by all comers, Hardin argued,
individual herders will each have a selfish incentive to add more and more
cows to graze on the commons until its carrying capacity is eventually
exceeded, bringing disaster to the community as a whole.60  The
underlying economic logic, according to Hardin, is that in adding an
additional cow to the commons, the individual herder appropriates all of
the benefits of the increase but is able to externalize or share the costs with
the community as a whole.6 1 The same logic underlies environmental
pollution, with the polluter appropriating the benefits of increased
production, but externalizing most of the pollution costs onto others. Thus,
homo oeconomicus provides a simple but elegant explanation for
environmental pollution, as well as other "market failures" that cry out for
government regulation.
The essence of "Hardin's paradox" is that adding the final "cow that
breaks the camel's back" is seen by Hardin as individually rational but
collectively irrational.6 2 Potential solutions to the problem of the conflict
between individual incentives and collective welfare, according to Hardin,
include governmental action to regulate the number of cows that can be
brought onto the commons, or subdividing common property right into
individual plots, so that individual landowners will have proper incentives
to manage property more rationally to the benefit the community as a
whole.6 T
Hardin's parable has been extraordinarily influential. Even though
Hardin had clearly identified private property as a possible solution, "the
tragedy of the commons" was seen by most as making the case for
increased government regulation to protect the environment. Like the
cattle herders in Hardin's article who were courting collective disaster by
selfish over exploitation of common resources, we in 20th century America
were courting environmental disaster if we did not institute expanded
government regulation to protect the environment. Hardin's "tragedy of
the commons" became the standard paradigm for justifying government
regulation to protect the environment. In 1983, when Professor William
Rogers and I conducted a workshop on teaching environmental law at the
annual convention of the American Association of Law Schools, every
single law professor teaching environmental law at the time reported that
he or she taught Hardin's "tragedy of the commons." Hardin's article was
even specifically mentioned in Congress as part of the legislative history of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.
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The influence of Hardin's paradigm was not limited to environmental
law, however. Soon a variety of legal problems in areas as far afield as
bankruptcy and oil and gas law were re-conceptualized as "tragedies of the
commons." A variety of different terms grew up to describe the essential
paradox identified by Hardin in the conflict between selfish individual
incentives and the interests of the community as a whole: common pool
problems, public good problems, the logic of collective action, free rider
problems, externalities, Prisoner's Dilemmas, and micro motives versus
macro motives. All of these models of human behavior turn on the
essential paradox identified by Hardin: that the pursuit of individual self-
interest can lead to collective disaster.64
There was only one problem with this simple yet elegant model of
human behavior as homo oeconomicus: Hardin was wrong. In fact, most
of the time people do not actually behave in the way that Hardin imagined;
they do not typically pursue narrow self-interest, lemming-like, into
collective disaster. Because Hardin's parable rang true to the temper of the
times (and possibly also because he published in a respected, scientific
publication), no one paid much attention to his methodology. Hardin cited
little if any empirical evidence that herders in traditional societies actually
behave in the ways asserted in his article. On the contrary, like makers of
parables since Jesus Christ, Hardin merely told a story and left it to the
audience to decide whether it rang true to their experience. Hardin's
method was, in short, more mythic than empiric.
When other scholars looked at how traditional societies actually
manage common property resources, however, they found a quite different
picture than that painted by Hardin. The seminal article is The Comedy of
the Commons, by my colleague at Yale Law School, Professor Carol
Rose.6 5 Rose pointed out that many traditional societies hold resources in
common, but that they only rarely "crash" into environmental disaster.
Rather, before the crucial "tipping point" of environmental degradation is
reached, either cultural norms, religious or other factors are often brought
into play to dissuade the individual from adding the "cow that breaks the
camel's back" onto the commons. In contrast to the exclusively legal
solutions envisioned by Hardin, Rose pointed out that cultural and other
factors often allow groups to manage common resources in ways that are
sustainable.
In actuality, neither Hardin's "tragedy" of the commons, in which
selfishness leads to disaster, nor Rose's "comedy" of the commons, in
which communities successfully regulate their relations with the
environment to ensure their long-term survival, is entirely adequate to
64 Hardin, supra note 14.
65 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
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explain the full range of human behavior. Human history contains
examples of both environmental successes and failures. There are
numerous examples in human history where valuable animals have been
made extinct, fisheries have been overfished, or dustbowls and deserts
created by over exploitation. 6 6 Both Rose's "comedy" and Hardin's
"tragedy" are successful models for some portion of the range of human
behavior, but neither fully accounts for all the data, nor explains why
sometimes human beings successfully regulate their relations with the
environment and sometimes fail to do so.
The problem of the tragi-comedy of the commons is analogous,
perhaps even identical, to the problem in biology of why a parasite kills the
host.6 7 Human beings are a kind of "parasite" on Mother Earth, and like
other parasites, they would be better off if they could manage to regulate
themselves so they do not over multiply, killing the host and also
themselves. In fact, as parasites multiply and become more widespread,
they tend to become less virulent, because the advantages to them of rapid
multiplication decrease. But most microbiological parasites do not have
sufficient foresight to regulate their own reproduction to the point that they
avoid killing the host. As UCLA physiologist and environmentalist Jared
Diamond points out, killing the host is not a goal of reproduction by
parasites, but an unintended consequence of their inability to regulate their
evolutionary "success." 6
8
Human beings, on the other hand, are unlike the AIDS virus or other
microbiological parasites in that our evolutionary strategy includes
foresight and culture as strategies for succeeding in the evolutionary battle
for survival. Margaret Donaldson, Professor Emeritus of Developmental
Psychology at the University of Edinburgh and a leading theoretician of
how the human brain works, describes this distinctive characteristic of
human brains as follows: "The devising of novel purposes comes readily
to us because we have brains that are good at thinking of possible future
states-at considering not merely what is but what might be.
' 69
The element of "foresight" in human brains-their ability to imagine
counterfactual and future states of the world-is a crucial element that
makes it possible that sometimes we manage environmental problems
successfully.
66 See, e.g., JARED DIAMOND, GuNs, GERMs AND STEEL: THE FATE OF HUMAN
SOCrETE.S (1997).
67 Elliott, Law and Biology, supra note 13, at 603-04. For an elaboration, see E.
Donald Elliott, The Tragi-Comedy of the Commons: Evolutionary Biology, Economics and
Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. (2001) (forthcoming).
68 Diamond, supra note 66, at 265-92.
69 MARGARET DONALDSON, HUMAN MnDS: AN EXPLORATION 9 (1st Am. ed. 1993).
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Foresight is one of the crucial elements of human nature that Hardin
leaves out of his account. The other is "altruism," the phenomenon that
humans (and other animals) will sometimes sacrifice what appears to be in
their own best interests to promote the survival of others, particularly close
kin. 7
0
When foresight and altruism are added to Hardin's parable, it is
possible to imagine that a great prophet arises who foresees the disaster
that faces the community if it continues to over graze the commons, and
perhaps even that the prophet's words are heeded, and that some form of
effective governance (a wise king, or a priest or even a community
meeting) does act successfully to regulate the cattle herding on the
commons. Successful "regulation" can include a variety of cultural and
religious norms, such as having more than five cows is no longer a
desirable sign of wealth. Sometimes such cultural norms are developed
and the community is saved, and sometimes they are not.7 1 But by
predicting that the herders will always be selfish and stupid, Hardin
oversimplifies the problem.
Programs that require mandatory assessment and dissemination of
information about anticipated effects on the environment can be
understood as attempts to mandate the social foresight that is a necessary
(but alas, not a sufficient condition) for solving the Problem of the
Commons. By requiring that the government must prepare an
"environmental impact statement" before it builds a new project, or by
requiring a company to compute and publicize the tons of hazardous
chemicals that it releases, society is requiring its "rulers" not to become
70 Elliott, Law and Biology, supra note 13, at 608.
71 In his recent tour de force of human history from an evolutionary perspective,
Guns, Germs, and Steel (which won both the Pulitzer prize and the National Science Medal)
and in his previous book, The Third Chimpanzee, Jared Diamond provides an analysis of
numerous societies, some of which solved and some of which failed to solve "The Problem
of the Commons." Diamond identifies the following factors that contribute to whether a
society fails to solve the Problem of the Commons:
"[S]mall, long-established, egalitarian societies tend to evolve
conservationist practices, because they've had plenty of time to get to
know their local environment and to perceive their own self-interest.
Instead, damage is likely to occur when people suddenly colonize an
unfamiliar environment ... or when people acquire a new technology
whose destructive power they haven't had time to appreciate ...
Damage is also likely in centralized states that concentrate wealth in the
hands of rulers, who are out of touch with the environment."
DmAMoND, TlE THD CHIMPANZEE, supra note 18, at 335-36 (emphasis added).
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"out of touch with the environment."' 72 Legal devices that require the
production of environmental information such as NEPA7 3 or TRI74 can be
understood as attempts to mandate foresight into the social consequences
of individual actions. Imagine that before one of Hardin's herders placed
an incremental cow on the commons, he or she had to stand before the
community and announce a public assessment of the likely consequences
of her actions. Such mandated foresight might not always prove successful
to prevent problems of overgrazing, but in some instances it might change
behavior.
Because we have learned Hardin's lessons too well, we tend to
overlook and undervalue the contributions that can be made by mandating
foresight into the consequences of individual's action on the environment.
As a result of assuming a simple economic model of the drivers of human
actions, we have probably over-invested in hard regulatory techniques such
as command-and-control standard-setting backed by criminal penalties,
which are designed to give people selfish reasons to act as if we were
unselfish. Information production is not a panacea, and it certainly cannot
replace other techniques entirely, but there are situations in which
mandated foresight can be successful, and in the United States at the
millennium we are probably under invested in these soft regulatory
techniques. 7 5
72 For a compatible vision of the broader potential of programs mandating
information disclosure, see William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure-
Parallel Universes and Beyond, HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. (forthcoming March 2001).
73 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852.
74 42 U.S.C. § 11,023.
75 See id.
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